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INTRODUCTION
The three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and the southern euro-
zone members (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) were among the hardest hit 
ones during the Great Recession and the eurozone crisis not only in Europe, but in 
the whole world. Back in 2009, international financial news outlets and economic 
experts were discussing the precarious situation in the Baltics, in particular their 
huge pre-crisis imbalances and the chosen policy of internal devaluation. Many 
were predicting that the Baltic strategy of internal devaluation would fail. How-
ever, contrary to these expectations, the Baltics managed to preserve the fixed 
exchange rate and restore fiscal sustainability. As a result, over the last couple of 
years, they are often pointed to as successful and even “model” cases of internal 
devaluation. While in 2008–09 one could refer to the Baltics as the “hELL” coun-
tries, these days one might perhaps be tempted to use the much happier-sounding 
“bELLs” label.
While the crisis receded in the Baltics, southern eurozone members found 
themselves in deep trouble facing contracting economies along with severe fiscal 
and banking problems. It was their turn to become the centre of attention of dis-
cussions in European and international financial as well as policy-making circles. 
The “GIPS” countries of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain faced similar chal-
lenges as the Baltics: an overvalued real exchange rate and the associated need 
to restore competitiveness, current account deficits, worsening fiscal situation 
and difficulties in accessing credit. Furthermore, they have been pursuing similar 
anti-crisis policies (internal adjustment, sometimes referred to as internal devalu-
ation) as the Baltics. Nevertheless, despite similar economic challenges and anti-
crisis policies, the southern eurozone members have been less successful than the 
Baltics in overcoming the crisis.
The above-mentioned similarities (in terms of economic challenges and re-
sponses) and divergences (in terms of outcomes of anti-crisis strategies) make 
the comparison of these different blocks of countries worthwhile. Furthermore, 
understanding the causes of the crisis as well as possible solutions to it is of ob-
vious practical relevance for the countries in question as well as for the future 
functioning and governance of the eurozone. Another motivation for the paper is 
theoretical – it aims to analyse the above-mentioned developments via the lens 
of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) framework. Despite its popularity, the VoC 
framework has also faced numerous criticisms, and thus it is interesting to see 
whether it can shed any light on these developments. It should be noted that 
earlier literature has already addressed the problems in the European “periphery” 
from the VoC perspective (see Hall 2012; Hancké 2013; Johnston et al. 2014; 
Hassel 2014 on the GIPS; Feldmann 2013 on Estonia and Kuokštis 2011 on the 
CRISIS IN THE BALTICS AND THE SOUTHERN EUROZONE 41
Acta Oeconomica 65 (2015)
Baltic countries). Partly building on these arguments, this article makes a contri-
bution in several ways. First of all, to my knowledge, it is the first comprehensive 
investigation in academic literature of the crisis experience between the Euro-
pean Southern countries and the Baltic ones encompassing the pre-crisis period, 
responses and the recovery. Second, this article presents an attempt to develop 
more precise hypotheses regarding different varieties’ proclivity towards imbal-
ances and recovery. 
The article’s first section briefly lays out the VoC framework and describes 
the types of capitalism existing in the Baltics and the GIPS. The next section de-
velops theoretical expectations that could be generated from the VoC theory. The 
next three sections constitute the analytical core of the article, dealing respective-
ly with developments prior to the crisis, responses during it, and the outcomes of 
adjustments. The article finishes with conclusions and discussion of policy issues 
as well as theoretical implications.
THE VOC FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATION 
TO THE BALTICS AND THE GIPS
The VoC approach has become very influential in the field of political economy 
since the seminal contribution by Hall – Soskice (2001).1 The framework puts em-
phasis on firms as actors and their need to resolve coordination problems within 
national political economies. Briefly, there are two main ideal types of capitalism: 
liberal market economies (or LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). 
Empirically, the US and the UK are usually considered as the canonical LME 
models, while Germany is often singled out as the real world case closest to the 
ideal CME model. LMEs and CMEs have different institutional profiles in many 
dimensions, including the nature of financial markets, corporate governance, ed-
ucation, welfare, and the labour market. Specifically, LMEs are characterised by 
the reliance on equity financing, flexible labour markets, limited welfare states, 
and general skills education, while CMEs rely on “patient capital”, high employ-
ment protection, extensive welfare regimes, and vocational education systems 
emphasising specific skills acquisition. Importantly, these configurations are not 
random, but represent the so-called institutional complementarities. According 
to Hall – Soskice (2001: 17), “two institutions can be said to be complementary 
1  This paper does not present a comprehensive overview of the VoC approach nor its criticisms, 
as it has already been covered extensively elsewhere, see the seminal contribution  by Hall – 
Soskice (2001), also Bohle – Greskovits (2009) as well as Hancké et al. (2007) for some of 
the criticisms and debates surrounding this approach.
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if the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns (or efficiency of) the 
other”. Furthermore, there is no single “best” model, as both LMEs and CMEs 
can be successful and efficient. However, they achieve efficiency differently, as 
they have their own specific comparative institutional advantages, with LMEs 
specialising in high-risk innovation (e.g. biotech) and CMEs specialising in in-
cremental innovation (e.g. automobiles and engineering) (Hall – Soskice 2001: 
41–44). An interesting and important implication of the VoC approach is that glo-
balisation, rather than pushing to global convergence on a single “liberal” model, 
might actually further reinforce the distinct varieties of capitalism as expanding 
international trade activities enable better use of comparative institutional advan-
tages (Hall – Soskice 2001: 56–60).
It must be noted that the vast majority of research carried out in the VoC strand 
of literature has focused on developed economies. However, scholars have also 
attempted to apply this framework to other contexts. Concerning the Baltic coun-
tries, although there is no unanimous agreement in the literature, most schol-
ars argue that the Baltic countries represent an LME-type of capitalism (Buchen 
2007; Feldmann 2006; Norkus 2008). Controversies arise due to the fact that 
these countries do not have all the characteristics of LMEs. For instance, Baltic 
economies do not possess developed equity markets, which are considered to be 
one of the core institutions of LMEs. In response, authors have argued that the 
Baltics are “emerging” LMEs and their developmental trajectory since regaining 
independence in the early 1990s was one of gradual convergence towards the 
LME model (Norkus 2008; Feldmann 2013). 
Several facts make the characterisation of Baltic economies as LMEs compel-
ling. First, the Baltic countries do not have coordinated wage bargaining sys-
tems and both employers’ and employees’ interest organisations are very weak 
(Norkus 2008). Weak trade unions mean that labour markets in the Baltics are 
very flexible. This flexibility is further enhanced by the fact that the enforcement 
of labour regulations is not strong. Besides, the Baltic higher education system 
is geared towards the development of general, and not specific skills (Feldmann 
2006; Norkus 2008; Martinaitis 2012). Furthermore, the Baltics redistribute rel-
atively little and have high income inequalities. State support in terms of un-
employment benefits and other social payments is weak, minimum wages are 
very low. Interestingly, in some respects, they are even more liberal and flexible 
than paradigmatic LMEs, such as the United States and the United Kingdom 
(Kuokštis 2011). According to Feldmann (2013: 496), “Estonia could be viewed 
as a most-likely case for the LME model”. Latvia and especially Lithuania also 
have a very high labour mobility. They are among the leading countries in the EU 
in terms of emigration. This feature can also be traced to the “flexible” nature of 
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Baltic economies where in times of difficulty the un employed leave the country 
and apply their “general” skills elsewhere and not put as much strain on public 
finances (Kuokštis 2011).
As with the Baltics, there is no unanimous consensus in the literature as to 
which type of capitalism the GIPS countries belong to. Nevertheless, they usu-
ally are placed in the “mixed market economy” (or MME) category. According to 
Molina – Rhodes (2007: 225), “analysing Europe’s MMEs requires that attention 
is paid – as one would expect – to their ‘mixed’ character and the complexities 
of their institutional systems”. These economies “contain different logics of co-
ordination and forms of actor interaction, making it difficult to talk of one na-
tional production model with a single form of comparative advantage” (Molina – 
Rhodes 2007: 225).
A good case in point is the labour market. In contrast to the flexible, fluid 
labour markets of LMEs, MMEs possess stronger trade unions and also have 
high employment protection. At the same time, trade unions in MMEs, although 
strong and able to veto many types of policies, generally have neither the will nor 
the ability to conduct coordinated wage bargaining. In other words, trade unions 
are strong enough to demand high wage increases, but not coordinated enough to 
be able to limit excessive wage growth. Overall, interest associations are highly 
fragmented and politicised (Molina – Rhodes 2007: 225). As Hancké put it (2013: 
91), “cross-industry wage coordination is considerably weaker than in the north 
of Europe, and as a result inter-sectoral wage drift is endemic”. Furthermore, in 
contrast to CMEs where the leading trade unions come from the tradables sec-
tor, in MMEs the sheltered sector (usually the public sector) dominates (Hancké 
2013: 97).
The state plays a major role in MMEs. Schmidt (2009) has even suggested 
calling them “state-influenced market economies” (SMEs). The state is very ac-
tive in these political economies (more so than in LMEs and CMEs) and tries to 
compensate for the deficiencies of the MME model because this type of capi-
talism lacks institutional coherence and is thus less efficient (Molina – Rhodes 
2007: 226). In MMEs, the state also serves as “protector” for both individuals (in 
terms of employment protection) and businesses (barriers to competitive pres-
sures as a result of high product market regulation). According to Hancké (2013: 
91), in MMEs, “the state regularly has to step in to compensate for the lack of 
autonomous bargaining capacity among the key actors”. However, this also in-
creases the politicisation of the system and leads to the preservation of economic 
inefficiencies.
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VOC AND MACROECONOMICS
In contrast to the insights on microeconomic issues, firm strategies, and pro-
duction regimes, significantly less attention has been paid in the literature so 
far to the macroeconomic implications of the VoC framework (Amable – Azizi 
2011). Nevertheless, several predictions could be generated. To begin with, on 
the broadest level, one would expect different forms of capitalisms to “behave” 
differently. This means that even when facing similar circumstances, different va-
rieties are expected to respond to them distinctively. Furthermore, similar policies 
implemented in different varieties of capitalism might have diverging outcomes. 
This also implies that “one-size-fits-all” policies might not be the best solution, 
and one should be careful about straightforward lesson-drawing based on both 
successes and failures in other countries.
Second, one of the most interesting predictions of the VoC framework is that 
“purer” types of capitalism (LMEs as well as CMEs) are expected to perform 
better than less “pure” ones. Hall – Gingerich (2009) show that both highly coor-
dinated (i.e. non-market coordinated) and highly uncoordinated (i.e. market co-
ordinated) types of capitalisms grow faster than “mixed” (or “hybrid”) ones. In a 
book debating the merits of the VoC approach, it was concluded that “as evidence 
from analyses of MMEs and EMEs in this volume and elsewhere reveals [...], 
the core Hall-Gingerich insight that economies with mixed or poorly calibrated 
modes of coordination will be outperformed by more coherent systems remains a 
valuable one” (Hancké et al. 2009: 14).
Turning specifically to macroeconomic issues, one could expect that compared 
to CMEs, LMEs would be more prone to developing macroeconomic imbalanc-
es and financial vulnerabilities as a result of economic “overheating” when the 
economy operates above capacity (i.e. the output gap is positive). Why could this 
be the case? The first reason is that LMEs rely heavily on financing from vola-
tile equity markets (as opposed to strategic banking interactions in coordinated 
market economies, or CMEs) which are known to focus on short-term results and 
have “impatient” capital. Second, LMEs are less strictly regulated, and thus could 
allow for more rapid expansion of financial innovation and speculation, which 
could potentially destabilise the financial system as well as encourage credit bub-
bles. Third, LMEs have a comparative institutional advantage in private services 
such as real estate and financial services (Feldmann 2013). Since an expanding 
financial sector might potentially contribute to asset price bubbles, this gives the 
third reason why LMEs might be more prone to economic “overheating”.
Like LMEs, MMEs are also expected to be more prone to the development 
of macroeconomic imbalances than CMEs. However, one could expect that this 
will happen somewhat differently than in LMEs. Specifically, one could expect 
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that an important source of this will be their labour market institutions. In MMEs, 
trade unions are strong enough to exercise bargaining power, but not organised 
enough to be participants in coordinated, efficient wage bargaining processes. 
This is especially true in countries where labour is dominated by non-tradable 
sectors, especially the public sector, which happens to be the case in MMEs 
(Hancké 2013). Furthermore, in MMEs the state plays an important role. Thus, 
it might have a tendency to “overspend” and “protect” industries when it has 
opportunities to do so (i.e. it could be more prone to political business cycles, 
thus exacerbating competitiveness deterioration during the boom or even start-
ing one). In MMEs, “organized interests use their resources to lobby the state 
for protection or compensation” (Hassel 2014: 7). Finally, the above-mentioned 
feature of MMEs – less “purity” on the microeconomic level – also means that 
there are limited opportunities for productivity growth, which in turn makes them 
more vulnerable to cost competitiveness deterioration. With regard to the rela-
tive inclination of LMEs and MMEs to develop “overheating”, expectations are 
ambiguous. On the one hand, MMEs have “problematic” labour markets, tend to 
experience lower productivity growth, while the state in MMEs is expected to be 
more willing to “compensate”. On the other hand, LMEs tend to rely on volatile 
financial markets, have comparative institutional advantage in “bubble-prone” 
economic sectors, and are less regulated.
Another hypothesis in the VoC literature in terms of macroeconomics is that 
“nonliberal economies should be expected to have less accommodating (i.e., less 
countercyclical) macroeconomic policies than liberal varieties” (Amable – Azi-
zi 2011: iii; Amable and Azizi in turn build their arguments on Iversen (2005), 
Soskice (2007), and Carlin – Soskice (2007)). More specifically, “faced with 
the same adverse macroeconomic shock, a CME would implement a restrictive 
budget policy in order to limit the deficit, whereas an LME would choose an 
expansionary budget deficit to limit the effects of the negative shock on the level 
of activity or unemployment” (Amable – Azizi 2011: 1). This is because LMEs, 
due to their limited welfare states, have weaker automatic stabilisers. Second, 
CMEs tend to prefer a rules-based aggregate demand management regime be-
cause of their labour markets. Trade unions’ demands for higher wages can trans-
late into higher unemployment, but if they believe that authorities will offset this 
via expansionary policies, trade unions might be less incentivised to seek wage 
moderation (Amable – Azizi 2011: 6–7). Thus, for CMEs it might be rational 
to adopt non-discretionary, rules-based policies. One could also add that due to 
the above-mentioned reasons (lower propensity for competitiveness losses and 
macro-imbalances), CMEs are generally expected to face fewer shocks. Even if 
they do, CMEs can also count on the fact that trade unions will generally be more 
incentivised to agree with and perhaps even seek wage moderation (because they 
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take into account competitiveness), and thus facilitate the adjustment process of 
cost reduction. Furthermore, trade unions in CMEs dominated by the exposed 
sector also oppose stimulus policies because this hurts competitiveness (Gabor 
– Ban 2013: 6). Contrariwise, per their higher propensity for macroeconomic 
imbalances, LMEs might be more willing to keep the option of stimulating the 
economy via monetary and fiscal policies in a discretionary manner.
What about MMEs in this regard? 1) MMEs have a rather limited welfare 
state which translates into fewer automatic stabilisers.2 2) They are more prone to 
competitiveness deterioration and build-up of imbalances. 3) Contrary to CMEs, 
MMEs lack coordinated wage bargaining systems which could help bring la-
bour costs down in situations when it is necessary to restore competitiveness. 
4) The state plays a very important role in the economy, it attempts to compen-
sate and protect domestic economic actors. 5) MMEs generally lack flexibility, 
which makes it harder for the economy to adjust. All of these factors imply that 
MMEs, just as LMEs, should tend to prefer discretionary, accommodative eco-
nomic policies. Indeed, the historical record of “GIPS” countries shows that be-
fore joining the single currency, these countries time and again relied on currency 
devaluations in response to competitiveness problems. 6) While both LMEs and 
MMEs are expected to prefer economic stimulus policies during recessions, one 
could predict that if for some reason they choose (or are forced to) impose aus-
terity, LMEs will tend to respond better than MMEs. This is for several reasons. 
First, the higher flexibility of labour markets (and overall economy) of LMEs will 
help them. Second, institutional coherence and the associated institutional com-
plementarities should allow for faster productivity growth (it is of course much 
easier economically and politically to adjust via higher productivity than lower 
wages). Third, due to the very important role of the state in MMEs, significant 
austerity will constitute a more important shock to these economies.
All of the above could also be used to generate a broader insight that generally 
CMEs will find fixed exchange rate systems (and hence membership in a cur-
rency union) more favourable than LMEs and MMEs. Both LMEs and MMEs are 
more prone to real exchange rate overvaluation and macroeconomic im balances. 
Therefore, they are likely to benefit more from macroeconomic discretion in 
terms of fiscal and monetary policies. During the crisis, they cannot rely on au-
tomatic stabilisers as CMEs, they also lack the capacity for wage restraint, which 
could bring down labour costs to adjust. At the same time, LMEs are expected to 
perform better than MMEs due to their higher flexibility, more opportunities for 
productivity growth, and lesser importance of the role of the state.  
2  Dolls et al. (2012) show that the Southern eurozone’s members have lower automatic stabilis-
ers than Continental and Northern European countries and even the US.
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PRE-CRISIS DEVELOPMENTS
The start and middle of the first decade of the 21st century was a good one for 
the Baltics. After experiencing a harsh economic downturn in the wake of the 
Russian crisis in 1998–1999, the Baltics emerged as one of the fastest grow-
ing economies in the world. As a result, in 2003, The Economist (2003) labelled 
Lithuania the “Baltic tiger” after the country posted a real GDP annual increase of 
9% along with “booming exports, zero inflation, a rock-steady currency, shrink-
ing unemployment and a budget surplus”. In Greece and Spain, GDP was also 
expanding fast. The situation was quite different in Italy and Portugal, though. 
These economies essentially stagnated during the 2000s (Table 1).
In both the Baltics and the GIPS, the pre-crisis growth relied heavily on do-
mestic demand. Initially, optimism was boosted by structural reforms and EU 
entrance in 2004 for the Baltics and by eurozone membership for the GIPS coun-
tries. Both of these processes, especially entrance into the eurozone, significantly 
lowered borrowing costs. In the GIPS, credit spreads between the “core” coun-
try of Germany and the southern members disappeared. This was related to two 
factors. First, despite the “no bailout” clause of the Lisbon Treaty, the implicit 
assumption in financial markets was that no country in the eurozone would be 
allowed to default. Second, due to the creation of the single currency area, ex-
change rate risk was (seemingly) eliminated. The latter factor was also important 
in the Baltic countries, as they had pegged their exchange rates to the euro and 
were expected to adopt the single European currency in the near future. These 
developments were also stimulated by loose global monetary policies due to the 
actions of the American Federal Reserve System as well as “global savings glut” 
(Marer 2010: 4).
Table 1. Real GDP developments in the Baltics and the GIPS, 2000 = 100
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Estonia 106.3 113.3 122.0 129.8 141.3 155.5 167.2
Latvia 107.3 115.0 123.8 134.7 148.3 164.6 181.1
Lithuania 106.7 114.0 125.7 135.0 145.5 156.9 172.2
Greece 104.2 107.8 114.2 119.2 121.9 128.6 133.2
Italy 101.9 102.3 102.3 104.0 105.0 107.3 109.1
Portugal 102.0 102.8 101.8 103.4 104.2 105.7 108.2
Spain 103.7 106.5 109.8 113.3 117.4 122.2 126.4
Source: Eurostat.
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Cheap credit financed rapid loan growth in both groups of countries. It fuelled 
consumption and investment, which added to lower unemployment and wage 
increases as well as inflation. Gradually, as wages were increasing faster than 
productivity, competitiveness weakened. The high growth of domestic demand 
and decreasing competitiveness translated into widening current account deficits 
(Figure 1). Current account deficits meant that countries were accumulating ex-
ternal debts, which in turn left these countries especially vulnerable in the face of 
a global financial crisis. The situation stands in stark contrast to Germany where 
the real exchange rate actually depreciated from 2000 to 2008, and the current 
account was in substantial surplus.
How can the VoC-perspective inform on the developments that led to the crisis? 
One of the predictions suggested in the theoretical part was that both LMEs and 
MMEs are more vulnerable to macroeconomic imbalances and competitiveness 
problems than CMEs, and in general tend to perform worse under fixed exchange 
rate systems. This is indeed compatible with the empirical record presented above. 
Both the Baltic LMEs and the Southern European MMEs gradually lost competi-
tiveness. As Hall (2012: 359) put it, “although largely unacknowledged, a basic 
asymmetry was built into EMU from its inception”. Germany and other Northern 
CMEs (such as Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland) used the single currency to 
foster their export-oriented growth model relying on wage restraint and constant 
productivity gains. In contrast, a domestic demand-led model developed in both 
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Figure 1. Current account in Germany, the GIPS, and the Baltic states in percentage of GDP
(simple unweighted averages taken for the GIPS and the Baltics)
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations.
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the GIPS and the Baltics. Furthermore, trade surpluses in CMEs were “recycled” 
into credit which was channelled back into the GIPS and the Baltics, thus encour-
aging the divergence even more (see Hall 2012 on the GIPS).
Another theoretical expectation is that different types of capitalism will tend to 
develop differently. The similar vulnerabilities accumulated by both Baltic LMEs 
and Southern European MMEs seem to speak against this expectation. Is there 
any evidence of different processes via which those imbalances were generated? 
First, there was a substantial difference between the two groups of countries in 
terms of underlying fundamentals’ development – while productivity growth was 
flat in all Southern countries throughout 2000s, all three Baltic countries expe-
rienced substantial and consistent productivity increases (see Appendix 1). This 
is indeed what we could have expected in terms of “pure” and “hybrid” types of 
capitalisms. 
What about labour markets? As argued in the theoretical section, MMEs can 
be expected to be especially vulnerable due to their labour market institutions. 
Indeed, in the GIPS, powerful trade unions dominated by non-tradable sectors 
– especially the public sector – put up demands for wage growth (Hancké 2013; 
Johnston et al. 2013). This was because these trade unions did not take into ac-
count the deterioration of competitiveness. However, it must also be mentioned 
that the flexible labour markets in the Baltics substantially overheated as well. 
In part, as in MMEs, this can be explained by the absence of wage coordina-
tion that requires cooperation between trade unions and employers representing 
the exposed sector (see also Gabor – Ban 2012: 7) according to whom “mixed 
market economies behave closer to the liberal economies that do not have the in-
stitutional constellations to accumulate external surpluses from export activity”). 
However, two further characteristics also mattered. First, the smallness of Baltic 
economies meant that capital inflows could “overheat” them more quickly. Sec-
ond, despite high wage growth, the elimination of barriers to work in other EU 
states brought by the accession provided huge incentives to emigrate due to sub-
stantial wage disparities. In turn, emigration caused labour shortages and added 
to wage spikes. All in all, however, as labour markets overheated in both groups 
of countries, the VoC perspective is not very helpful in differentiating between 
them. Rather, the imbalances were primarily related to the speculation in real 
estate (as predicted). At the same time, financial speculation, real estate booms, 
and private sector overborrowing occurred in the GIPS as well (although the pat-
tern was much more consistent across the Baltic group than the GIPS block). The 
latter observation makes the VoC perspective less useful in differentiating the 
development paths between MMEs and LMEs.
Furthermore, the theoretical discussion raised the possibility that MMEs might 
be more prone to develop vulnerabilities due to their higher inclination for politi-
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cal business cycles and public overspending. Are these predictions compatible 
with the empirical record? There is some evidence to suggest that politicians’ in-
clination to add to the boom was stronger in the GIPS than in the Baltic countries. 
Public deficit figures prior to the crisis show that the Baltic states had lower fiscal 
deficits prior to the crisis (although Spain is a clear exception, while Greece is the 
worst outlier) (see Table 2); furthermore, public debt as share of GDP was falling 
in the Baltics but not the GIPS (with the exception of Spain). Tellingly, Estonia as 
the most “coherent” LME had budget surpluses (while nominal fiscal deficits in 
both Latvia and Lithuania as a percentage of GDP were declining). 
One could respond to this that instead of fiscal political business cycles, Baltic 
politicians (as well as GIPS governments) engaged in political credit “cycling”, 
as credit to the private sector expanded very rapidly prior to the crisis. While 
it would be hard to deny that this element played a role, one could make the 
argument that credit booms in these countries were less a result of an error of 
commission rather than an error of omission. Take the case of the Baltic coun-
tries during the boom years. While it is true that many observers (both foreign 
and domestic) raised concerns about the very rapid credit growth and real estate 
bubbles, many predicted or at least expected a “soft landing” scenario. After all, 
some economists would even argue that bubbles are extremely hard and perhaps 
impossible to identify and even if they are identified, central banks should not try 
to burst them. Besides, central banks in the Baltics as well as the GIPS lacked 
the means to substantially affect credit bubbles. Aside from public persuasion 
and warnings, the only feasible instrument they possessed in their policy arsenal 
was bank reserve requirements. However, due to the ability of the subsidiaries of 
Swedish banks to import capital from mother banks, such a move would have had 
little effect (in fact, Estonia tightened mortgage credit requirements in early 2006 
Table 2. Public balance in percentage of GDP, 
average of 2001–2007
Germany –2.8
Estonia 1.4
Latvia –1.2
Lithuania –1.4
Greece –5.8
Italy –3.3
Portugal –4.3
Spain 0.6
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations.
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(IMF 2006) but this did little to stop the credit boom). Thus, one could say that 
the relative contribution of deliberate political business cycles was stronger in 
GIPS compared to the Baltics. However, the importance of this conclusion should 
be treated with caution, as the primary source of pre-crisis vulnerabilities was 
mostly related to competitiveness issues and credit growth in the private sector, 
and less with fiscal profligacy (with the exception of Greece). Prior to the crisis, 
fiscal deficits in the Baltics were lower than in Germany (see Table 2). As for the 
GIPS, Spain on average had fiscal surpluses, and both Italy and Portugal did not 
have fiscal deficits much higher than those in Germany (see also Dăianu 2012).3
Overall, the empirical evidence related to VoC’s predictions during the pre-cri-
sis period is mixed. On the one hand, there was a substantial difference between 
the two groups of countries in terms of underlying productivity growth. Second – 
although less importantly –, there is some evidence about the bigger relative con-
tribution of political business cycles to the accumulation of pre-crisis imbalances 
in the GIPS group (with the exception of Spain) compared to the Baltics. On the 
other hand, both groups of countries experienced similar problems resulting from 
excessive wage growth and thus decreasing competitiveness, capital inflows and 
excessive borrowing.
RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
Substantial economic imbalances described in the previous section meant that 
both the Baltics and the GIPS countries were very vulnerable when the global 
financial crisis hit. When discussing the crisis experience in these countries, it 
is also important to remember that they were encountering not “one” crisis, but 
rather several different, although interrelated, challenges. As discussed by Sham-
baugh (2012), in the case of the GIPS, there was a banking crisis, a sovereign 
debt crisis, and an economic growth crisis. A similar story could be told about the 
Baltic countries, although compared to the GIPS, the Baltics (except for Latvia, 
see later) had fewer problems in the banking sector, while they faced an even 
more severe growth crisis, at least in the early years of adjustment (as real GDP in 
2009 contracted by double-digit numbers). Furthermore, while those challenges 
were distinct, the different elements of the crisis reinforced each other, creating a 
3  Of course, this does not mean that fiscal policy is not important. Clearly, tighter fiscal poli-
cies would have helped to limit economic “overheating”. Furthermore, as shown by Estonia’s 
case, fiscal discipline prior to the crisis helps during it as it provides additional resources for 
government. Nevertheless, even a very prudent fiscal policy such as the one in Estonia did not 
help to prevent the build-up of economic imbalances and overheating, or avoid a double-digit 
economic contraction.
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downward spiral and making adjustment efforts even harder (for instance, lower 
growth negatively impacted the fiscal situation, while higher public deficits in 
turn called for more fiscal consolidation, thus suppressing aggregate demand 
even further) (Shambaugh 2012).
Both the Baltics and the GIPS countries implemented similar anti-crisis policy, 
namely internal devaluation (sometimes also referred to as internal adjustment). 
This strategy consisted of two main important components: preservation of the 
currency peg (in the case of the GIPS, staying in the eurozone) and fiscal consoli-
dation (or adjustment). Furthermore, structural reforms were also pursued. Fiscal 
consolidation was deemed necessary both to ease balance of payments problems, 
support downward adjustment of wages and salaries (via lower aggregate de-
mand) as well as in its own right in order to restore fiscal sustainability, which 
was called into question.
Of the three Baltic countries, only Latvia applied for international financial as-
sistance which was provided by the IMF, the EU, and certain EU member states. 
Estonia relied on its own fiscal reserves accumulated prior to the crisis, while 
Lithuania turned to the bond markets to finance the gap between public revenue 
and expenditure. In contrast to Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia was the only coun-
try which had a large bank owned domestically, and its failure aggravated the 
country’s situation. Greece, Portugal, and Spain applied for financial assistance 
organised by the “Troika” consisting of the EU Commission, the ECB, and the 
IMF. Under these packages, financial assistance was provided for the southern 
eurozone members under strict conditions set for both fiscal consolidation and 
structural reforms.
At first glance, the experience of these countries in terms of response seems 
to go against VoC predictions, as one would expect different capitalisms to re-
spond differently. According to Hayes et al. (2012: 231), “while responses may 
vary across the EU in terms of their specific content, pace and degree, common 
tendencies have emerged across different ‘varieties of capitalism’. This develop-
ment is not easily explained by the VoC approach, which predicts that responses 
to ‘exogenous shocks’ will differ between the varieties of capitalism”. 
However, a closer scrutiny of policies in the two groups of countries reveals 
an important difference. First, the Baltics reacted much earlier, faster, and more 
consistently. Their austerity programs were “heavily front-loaded” (Åslund 2012: 
4). This can be partly explained by the fact that the crisis hit the Baltics earlier 
than it did the GIPS. However, a big part of the explanation is also that austerity 
is the “primary instinct” of Baltic policy-makers when facing a crisis (Kattel – 
Raudla 2011). Such was the reaction during the Russian crisis in 1997–1998 and 
earlier, during the period of transition from communism. In contrast, the “primary 
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instinct” of policy-makers in Europe’s south was to enact macroeconomic stimu-
lus or at least delay austerity as much as possible. For instance, “Spain introduced 
a package of expansionary measures in 2008 and 2009 totalling 4% of GDP” 
(Monastriotis et al. 2013). Having in mind the compensating role of the state in 
these MMEs, this made sense, although it complicated their fiscal situation down 
the road. Overall, there was much less sense of an “imposed” policy by external 
actors (such as the EU or Germany) in the Baltics than in Southern Europe. One 
could conclude that the Baltics actually “chose” internal adjustment (although 
this does not necessarily mean that their populations particularly liked it), while 
the GIPS only started implementing austerity policies when they ran out of all 
other options. Estonia’s case is the most revealing, as it had substantial reserves 
and thus an option of not pursuing fiscal consolidation (or at least not such a rapid 
and strong one), but it still went along with the austerity program.
One must also remember the prediction laid out in the theoretical part that 
LMEs will tend to prefer economic stimulus policies during the crisis. This is at 
odds with the Baltic response. However, if we adopt the “spirit” of the VoC per-
spective and look closely at the institutional set-up as well as other background 
conditions, we can find the logic behind the Baltic response. The theory why 
LMEs should tend to implement stimulus relies on the assumption that such 
political economies possess few automatic stabilisers. But this ignores the pos-
sibility that the problem of excessive unemployment can be addressed in other 
ways. In the Baltics, policymakers could expect to rely on traditionally high 
labour mobility. In turn, this can be attributed to the high flexibility of their la-
bour markets. Second, another difference between established LMEs and Baltic 
political economies was an even lower importance of the state in economy in 
terms of public goods provision and support for investment into research and 
development (Kuokštis 2011). Thus, austerity policies could be considered to be 
less detrimental to these countries’ production profiles. Third, the even higher 
flexibility of Baltic labour markets compared to canonical LMEs meant that the 
adjustment process could be expected to be faster. Interestingly, as suggested 
by Feldmann (2013: 499) on Estonia’s internal devaluation, “this adjustment 
strategy and the fact that wages were relatively flexible downwards could also 
suggest the Estonian political economy may come closer to the theoretical ideal 
type of a pure LME than the canonical examples of LME economies, like the 
UK or the US, given this strong emphasis on market-based adjustment mecha-
nisms”. As shown by Walter (2014), the Baltic countries (in contrast to the GIPS 
block) were relatively less vulnerable to internal compared to external adjust-
ment (currency devaluation).
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OUTCOMES OF THE ANTI-CRISIS POLICY
Following a very steep decline, the Baltic economies rebounded quickly. In contrast, 
the GIPS block continues to struggle. While the situation stabilised after ECB’s 
president Draghi’s comments about the readiness to “do whatever it takes” to save 
the eurozone, clearly the southern eurozone members are not out of the woods yet. 
In terms of unemployment, as shown in Figure 2, it shot up fast in the Baltics from 
2007 to 2010, but then started falling. In contrast, the average unemployment rate 
in the GIPS, although below the Baltic one in 2009 and 2010, in 2012 was already 
higher and increased further in 2013. It fell only slightly in 2014.
How can we explain this divergence between the GIPS and the Baltics? Can 
the differences in these countries’ institutional arrangements described earlier ac-
count for it, as suggested by the VoC framework? To begin with, one should name 
several important additional factors which can help to account for the difference 
in outcomes. First, the Baltics were much smaller and open economies, which 
meant that it was easier for them to “export themselves out” of the crisis. This 
also meant that contractionary fiscal policy was relatively less painful due to 
lower multipliers. Secondly, with the exception of Latvia, they did not face major 
problems in the banking sector, contrary to what happened in the GIPS. Third, 
coming into the crisis, their public debts were significantly lower and this helped 
to escape the vicious circle of low economic growth and high public debt. Finally, 
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Figure 2. Unemployment rate in the Baltics and the GIPS, in percentage 
(simple unweighted averages)
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations.
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Kattel – Raudla (2013) mention that the use of EU structural funds substantially 
helped the Baltic countries during the downturn and partly compensated for the 
budget revenue loss.4 
That said, several important aspects of the diverging outcomes can be explained 
by the VoC perspective. To begin with, while it is true that smallness (and thus 
openness) helped the Baltic countries, it is also true that due to their exceptional 
flexibility, the Baltics were able to use this opportunity more successfully. An 
important part of this was wage flexibility (Purfield – Rosenberg 2010) although 
it should be mentioned that wages in the private sector decline significantly less 
than in the public sector (see Appendix 2 for the comparison of wage adjustment 
in the Baltics and the GIPS). In contrast, it took longer for wages in Portugal and 
Greece to start falling, while in Italy and Spain – despite substantial growth of 
unemployment – nominal wages essentially did not adjust during the crisis (see 
Appendix 2; also O’Rourke – Taylor 2013). It must also be recognised that tak-
ing into account a longer time-frame, nominal wages have now adjusted more in 
Portugal and Greece than in the Baltic countries. Nevertheless, one must have in 
mind that by 2010–2011 the adjustment process in the Baltic countries was essen-
tially over, and wages started increasing in response to falling unemployment.
However, in the Baltics this flexibility encompassed other important dimen-
sions apart from nominal downward wage adjustment. One of them was emigra-
tion. In response to the crisis, outward migration increased substantially in Latvia 
and especially in Lithuania. This eased the pressures on state budgets and the 
whole economy, at least in the short-term. In turn, part of the explanation for high 
emigration can be linked to the “general skills” education and lack of support-
ing welfare spending in the Baltics, which are characteristic of the Baltic model 
(Kuokštis 2011).
Another dimension of flexibility was related to business strategies. It is true 
that downward nominal wage adjustment helped. However, the contribution of 
productivity growth to declining unit labour costs was even stronger, especially 
in the tradable sector (as noted by Blanchard et al. (2013) in Latvia’s case). Baltic 
firms were able to adjust fast and reorient themselves towards exports. As Figure 
3 reveals, bigger adjustments in the real effective exchange rate (REER) (based 
on unit wage costs in manufacturing, which serves as a proxy for the tradable sec-
tor) were positively associated with higher exports growth during the crisis. 
4  Regarding this point, however, one must remember that even with the higher use of EU fi-
nancing fiscal consolidation in the Baltic countries was very substantial (see, for instance, 
Krals 2014). Furthermore, GIPS, although to a lesser extent, also benefited from EU structural 
funds; they also relied on other forms of financing available to eurozone members, namely 
European Stability Mechanism and also the TARGET2 system).
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As Blanchard et al. (2013) note in analysing Latvia’s case, this was unexpected 
and quite a puzzle in the light of macroeconomic theory. This aspect deserves 
further scrutiny in the future, but a tentative explanation as to why this happened 
can be provided. Going back to the description of the Baltic model, it was stat-
ed that these economies, to use Karl Polanyi’s terminology, have relatively few 
signs of “protective countermovement” from the market forces (see also Bohle 
– Greskovits 2012) who, inspired by a Polanyian perspective, conceptualise the 
Baltic regime as “neoliberal” characterised by high efficiency and macroeco-
nomic discipline but also higher inequality and low “protection”). This is true for 
the population at large in terms of limited unemployment benefits and general 
compensation, but also for businesses (few subsidies and very limited industrial 
policy) (Bohle – Greskovits 2012). When economic conditions turn sour, the state 
does not come in and “protect” (“compensate”) for the downturn. Instead, Baltic 
firms are largely left on their own. One could therefore hypothesise that over time 
they have become accustomed to wide fluctuations in economic conditions and 
thus more adaptable to changing circumstances. Furthermore, low state involve-
ment (in the form of unemployment benefits, automatic stabilisers, etc.) helped 
in terms of putting less pressure on the state budget benefits, which in turn eased 
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Figure 3. Change in real effective exchange rate (REER) and exports growth, % 
Notes: Real effective exchange rate is based on unit wage costs in manufacturing and was calculated from pre-
crisis peak year to 2011. Exports’ growth was calculated from 2009 to 2011.
Source: AMECO database for REER; Eurostat for exports; author’s calculations.
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the fiscal situation and helped to pursue fast fiscal consolidation. Finally, Kattel 
– Raudla (2013) mention that the use of EU structural funds substantially helped 
the Baltic countries during the downturn and partly compensated for the revenue 
loss. Last but not least, one should also note that what happened in the Baltics 
during the adjustment was a continuation of a historically strong productivity 
growth mentioned previously (see also Appendix 1 as well as Blanchard et al. on 
Latvia 2013: 351).
Finally, even changes in cost competitiveness (as captured by relative unit la-
bour costs) do not necessarily tell the whole story. First, what matters is not only 
the price, but also quality of exports. Furthermore, even if potentially attractive 
opportunities exist in the tradable sector, reallocation might be hindered due to 
factors such as barriers to entry, excessive product and labour market regulation, 
etc. GIPS countries compare unfavourably on these dimensions with the Baltic 
States.5 If one looks at the data extending to 2013 (see Figure 4), Spain and Portu-
gal in fact have already adjusted more in terms of cost competitiveness compared 
5  For instance, according to the “ease of doing business” score in the World Bank’s Doing Busi-
ness Report (2008), Estonia is in the 17th place, Latvia in the 22nd, and Lithuania in the 26th. 
Contrast that to GIPS’ rankings: Portugal takes the 37th place, Spain the 38th place, Italy comes 
in the 53rd place, while Greece only takes the 100th place. 
Figure 4. Change in real effective exchange rate (REER) and exports growth, % 
Notes: Real effective exchange rate is based on unit wage costs in manufacturing and was calculated from pre-
crisis peak year to 2013. Exports’ growth was calculated from 2009 to 2013
Source: AMECO database for REER; Eurostat for exports; author’s calculations.
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to Latvia and Estonia (as mentioned above, adjustment was essentially over in 
the Baltics by 2011, and subsequently wages started increasing), but were still 
lagging behind in terms of exports’ growth (although they performed better than 
Greece and Italy, which corroborates the general relationship between cost com-
petitiveness and exports). According to Tressel – Wang (2014: 10), in the GIPS 
“the data suggests that there is little evidence that a real reallocation of resources 
has so far taken place between tradable and non-tradable sectors”. Furthermore, 
they find that among non-cost factors positively influencing exports performance 
in the eurozone, lower business cost (cost of starting a business) and lower em-
ployment protection stand out as significant predictors. Factors hindering sectoral 
reallocation and productivity growth, such as high labour and product market 
regulation and lack of competition, are characteristic of the “mixed” Southern 
European political economies.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The experience of the Baltic countries has been the topic of many policy-relat-
ed discussions, and the situation in the GIPS countries even more so. A VoC-
 informed perspective presents a valuable corrective to a popular view attributing 
troubles to largely irresponsible fiscal policies and policy mistakes (Hall 2012; 
Hancké 2013; Johnston et al. 2013; see also Dăianu 2012 for a similar conclu-
sion, although from a different theoretical perspective). It also encourages one 
to question the one-size-fits-all thinking, for instance that economic flexibility is 
the only way for countries to recover. At the same time, one could also criticise 
the policy views provided by authors who discussed the situation in the eurozone 
coming from the VoC perspective.
This is because it is hard to be satisfied with the policy alternatives offered. 
Hall (2012) rejects the advice for everyone to become “more flexible” and pursue 
fiscal consolidation, but he does not offer any substantial alternatives. Hancké 
does provide more specific policy solutions. He suggests that a “proper fiscal 
union” should be created to counteract “excessive inflation divergence when it 
emerges” (2013: 100), and, secondly, that “Germany and its northern neighbours 
would have to rethink their domestic economies away from the massive reli-
ance on exports to the rest of EMU, and adopt more classical Keynesian policies 
geared toward managing domestic demand”. The trouble with these solutions, 
however, is that they are politically unrealistic. Besides, these authors hardly talk 
about doing anything with the institutional arrangements within the GIPS. This is 
strange, because a VoC-informed perspective would actually point at institutional 
deficiencies/non-complementarities as the primary potential source of trouble 
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giving rise to lack of competitiveness in the southern economies. In other words, 
such a perspective would suggest implementing reforms that would direct the 
southern economies either towards an LME or a CME type of capitalism. Of 
course, such reforms are expected to bear fruit only in the longer run, and can be 
very costly in the short run, both economically and politically.
As for the Baltic economies, while the VoC perspective can inform us as to how 
the Baltic countries adjusted during the crisis, it also provides certain concerns 
about the future of these economies. First, it was mentioned in this article that a 
big reason why the Baltics recovered fast was an unexpected increase in produc-
tivity. It is reasonable to suggest that in the future, such opportunities for very 
fast and big productivity increases will be smaller. Second, if the VoC framework 
is correct, one could expect that when (if) the Baltics mature into “advanced” 
LME-types and fully develop the corresponding institutional prerequisites, the 
state will need to play a bigger role. In LMEs, the state is actively involved in 
supporting basic research and developments activities which are not sufficiently 
financed by private actors due to their public good nature. As the state begins to 
play a more active role in these activities in the Baltics, it will likely need higher 
fiscal capacities, which in turn might preclude fast and extensive fiscal consoli-
dation in the future. Overall, the Baltics in the future might find it beneficial to 
rethink their adjustment processes along the lines of adjustments in the small 
Western countries which, as famously discussed by Katzenstein (1985), used to 
adjust “flexibly”, but in a very different way (see also Kuokštis 2015).
As for theoretical implications, the analysis in this article has largely found 
the VoC framework useful, although this perspective should also be supplement-
ed by the analysis of additional, contextual factors. Furthermore, this perspective 
turned out to be relatively more successful at explaining the responses to and 
recovery (or lack thereof) from the crisis. The internal devaluation response was 
more in line with the nature of the Baltic political economies, and subsequently 
they responded to the policy better due to higher flexibility and more opportuni-
ties for productivity growth. In terms of pre-crisis developments, although the 
VoC perspective did generate some useful insights (most importantly, related to 
higher productivity growth in LMEs compared to MMEs), it was not very use-
ful in distinguishing between the paths of imbalances between the two groups 
of countries. 
The discussion in this article also points to two aspects that are worth paying 
attention to more closely. First, on a broad level, the implications of the VoC 
framework for macroeconomic issues need to be investigated more thoroughly. 
Second, on a more specific note, the analysis suggests that the macroeconomic 
framework might matter in terms of how well different types of capitalism per-
form. Namely, CMEs are expected to perform ceteris paribus better under fixed 
60 V. KUOKŠTIS
Acta Oeconomica 65 (2015)
exchange rate regimes than LMEs and especially MMEs. In fact, the analysis 
provided here suggests another channel which could explain why “hybrid” capi-
talisms might be less efficient over the long run, namely that MMEs are both 
more prone to macroeconomic imbalances and find it hard to adjust to them, 
especially if they adopt fixed exchange rates.
Finally, an important caveat is in order. To account for the developments in 
the Baltic countries and the GIPS group, this article relied on the VoC frame-
work which puts primary emphasis on economic-structural factors. It therefore 
neglected important political-institutional factors such as interest groups, party 
politics, and ideas. This was done to provide a more parsimonious explanation as 
well as to see how far the VoC framework can “carry” us. For instance, Kattel – 
Raudla (2013) attribute the Baltic response to specific ideas and institutional iner-
tia in terms of policy-making rather than economic structure (as was done in this 
article). It is worthwhile to compare different explanatory perspectives in future 
research (although it would be surprising if the Baltic responses did not reflect 
at least some underlying economic logic, as also revealed by their subsequent 
relatively successful recovery).
Another way to extend the analysis is to look into other countries’ experience. 
Ireland seems to be a good candidate in this regard. Furthermore, a preliminary 
view of Ireland’s experience seems to be compatible with the framework outlined 
in this article. Ireland, like the Baltic countries, is generally considered to be an 
LME. And, indeed, in many ways Ireland seems to have “behaved” similarly to 
the Baltic countries during the crisis. Compared to the Southern eurozone econo-
mies, it reacted earlier and faster and recovered more successfully (Tressel – Wang 
2012), to a large extent relying on exports’ growth (see also Regan (2012) who dis-
cusses Ireland’s crisis experience from a VoC-inspired perspective). Finally, one 
could also test the theoretical predictions suggested in this article regarding differ-
ent varieties’ behaviour before, during and after the crisis in a large-N setting.
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APPENDIX 1
Labour productivity per hour worked in the GIPS and the Baltics 
(simple unweighted averages), 2005 = 100.
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations.
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APPENDIX 2
Wages and salaries in the business sector of the Baltics and the GIPS, 
seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by working days, third quarter of 2008 = 100. 
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations.
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